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Using a panel of 21 OECD countries and 40 years of annual data, we find that countries with similar
government budget positions tend to have business cycles that fluctuate more closely. That is, fiscal
convergence (in the form of persistently similar ratios of government surplus/deficit to GDP) is system-
atically associated with more synchronized business cycles. We also find evidence that reduced fiscal
deficits increase business cycle synchronization. The Maastricht "convergence criteria", used to deter-
mine eligibility for EMU, encouraged fiscal convergence and deficit reduction. They may thus have indi-
rectly moved Europe closer to an optimum currency area, by reducing countries' abilities to create idio-
syncratic fiscal shocks. Our empirical results are economically and statistically significant, and robust. 
Keywords: European; monetary; union; policy; Maastricht; criteria; optimum; Mundell.
JEL Classification Numbers: F42
Abstract6
1 Introduction
In 1998, European countries qualified for entry into European Monetary Union (EMU) on the basis of
five "convergence criteria". The criteria were enshrined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and quantify tar-
gets concerning inflation, long-term bond yields, exchange rates, government debt, and the govern-
ment budget. The Maastricht convergence criteria are of more than of historical relevance, since they
will also be applied to future EMU entrants. Further, the 1997 "Stability and Growth Pact" implies that
the fiscal criteria are still, in principle, binding.
1
Most economists – particularly non-Europeans – view the Maastricht convergence criteria with skep-
ticism. The reason is simple: they have little to do with standard economic arguments concerning
"optimal currency areas", monetary unions that are desirable and sustainable. The consensus in eco-
nomics is that from a theoretical viewpoint, monetary unions make sense for countries with synchro-
nized business cycles, integrated markets, flexibility, and mechanisms to share risk. The overlap
between the Maastricht convergence criteria and the optimum currency area criteria is small.
2
Clearly the direct correspondence between the (Maastricht) criteria actually applied for EMU entry
and the appropriate (optimum currency area) criteria is poor. In this paper we ask if there is an indi-
rect connection. We focus on the most controversial Maastricht criteria – the total government budg-
et deficit/GDP ratio – and link it empirically to arguably the most important optimum currency area cri-
terion, namely the synchronization of business cycles. Using a panel of data that includes twenty-one
countries and forty years of data, we show that countries with divergent fiscal policies (i.e., large aver-
age cross-country differences in the ratio of general government net lending/borrowing to GDP) tend to
have less synchronized business cycles. We estimate that each percentage point of fiscal divergence
between a pair of countries tends to lower the correlation coefficient of their business cycles by
between .03 and .12. This effect is both statistically and economically significant. We also show that
reduced levels of primary fiscal deficits (or increased primary surpluses) tend to increase the level of
business cycle synchronization, though the evidence for this effect is somewhat weaker.
A concrete example may clarify things. When the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992, the total
Italian budget deficit was 10.7% of GDP, and had been hovering at or above 11% of GDP for a
decade. This was in sharp contrast to the typical German deficit, which was 2.6% of GDP in 1992.
3
The drive to enter EMU – that is, to satisfy the Maastricht criteria – encouraged this gap to shrink by
around eight percentage points; by the 1999 start, Italy's budget deficit had fallen to 1.7%, similar
to the German deficit of 1.5%. In this paper, we ask: could such fiscal convergence have an effect
on the synchronization of business cycles between Germany and Italy? Alternatively, the (cross-
1 In EU terminology, EMU technically refers to Economic and Monetary Union, which is different from the euro area. All EU countries are members
of the Economic and Monetary Union, but only twelve members are currently members of the euro area. In the academic literature, EMU generally
refers to the European monetary union. In this paper we follow conventional practice and use EMU to refer to the euro area.
2 We ignore the design of monetary institutions and policies for the time being. These are relevant to both the Maastricht Treaty and Optimum
Currency Area considerations, but are not intrinsically either national or international. In any case, there is considerable overlap between the two
sets of criteria in this respect.
3Table 7A of "Cyclical Adjustment of Budget Balances" produced by ECFIN, EC, Spring 2005, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/indicators/general_government_data/2005/cabb_spring2005en.pdfIntroduction
7
country) standard deviation of the government budget position/GDP ratio was 4.1% for the EURO-
12 in 1991, and only 2.1% in 1999; did this convergence in fiscal positions affect business cycle
synchronization at the start of EMU?
4 We find that the answer is generally positive; a larger panel of
OECD data indicates that fiscal convergence (in either the total or primary budget balance) is sys-
tematically associated with more synchronized economic activity. Whether or not it was intentional,
the application of the Maastricht convergence criteria may have moved the EMU entrants closer to
being an optimum currency area, since fiscal convergence tends to synchronize business cycles!
We stress at this point that we know of no theoretical model formally linking fiscal convergence to
business cycle synchronization. Still, we do not think it is difficult to understand our results. Fiscal
convergence, by our definition, usually occurs because a country that has been fiscally irrespon-
sible – that is, a country that has run persistently high budget deficits – reforms and closes the fis-
cal gap with other countries. Intuitively, countries that are fiscally irresponsible – i.e., countries that
run persistently high budget deficits – are also countries that create idiosyncratic fiscal shocks.
(This seems a natural association to us; irresponsible behavior is often idiosyncratic, for individu-
als as well as fiscal authorities.) In this case, reducing the budget deficit of a country simultane-
ously reduces its scope for idiosyncratic fiscal shocks, raising the coherence of its business cycle
with the business cycle of others. That is, fiscal convergence raises business cycle synchroniza-
tion since responsible fiscal behavior tends to be less idiosyncratic fiscal behavior.
We mention in passing that we know of no deliberate intent on the part of the creators of the
Maastricht convergence criteria to affect the optimum currency criteria, either directly or indirect-
ly. Our effect seems to have been an unintended side-benefit to the convergence process.
In section 2 we describe our methodology. Our results on the link between fiscal convergence and
business cycle synchronization are presented in section 3; we link budget deficits to business
cycle volatility more directly in the following section. The paper ends with a brief conclusion.
4Again, we use Table 7A of "Cyclical Adjustment of Budget Balances." For further analysis, see Fatás and Mihov (2003b).What should the effect of persistent fiscal divergence be on business cycle synchronization? To our
knowledge, there is no formal treatment of this topic in the extant literature.
Countries are subject to asymmetric shocks (e.g. exchange rate and/or wage shocks). Further, sim-
ilar shocks (e.g. oil price shocks) can have asymmetric effects across countries because of differ-
ing propagation mechanisms. If these asymmetries are persistent, and are partially offset with dis-
cretionary fiscal policy or automatic fiscal stabilizers, then fiscal divergence can, in principle, be
associated with greater business cycle synchronization. For example, suppose that Austria and
Belgium begin with identical budget positions and perfectly synchronized business cycles. Austria
receives a persistent negative shock, and responds with expansionary fiscal policy that neutralizes
any effect on its cycle. In this case, Austria's business cycle remains synchronized with the Belgian
economy ceteris paribus, while the Austrian deficit diverges from the Belgian.
Of course, fiscal policy in some countries is pro-cyclic, as shown by Gavin and Perotti (1997); see
also Kaminsky et al (2004) and Aguiar et al (2005). Fiscal policy can also be a source of shocks, for
e.g., purely political reasons (e.g., Brender and Drazen, 2004). Suppose that Austrian fiscal policy
expands in the absence of shocks to either Austria or Belgium, and generates an Austrian expan-
sion. In this case fiscal divergence will be associated with reduced business cycle synchronization.
From a theoretical viewpoint then, the matter is ambiguous. If fiscal policy divergence is a response
to asymmetric shocks then it may be associated with enhanced business cycle coherence; if fiscal
shocks themselves cause business cycles, then the opposite may be true. Without persistent
shocks (or shocks with persistent effects), there may be no relationship at all between fiscal policy
divergence and business cycle synchronization. The question is thus ultimately empirical. While the
absence of a formal structural framework makes us uncomfortable, we see no alternative but to take
the issue to the data.
The literature gives only a few hints about the matter. Several authors argue that a world business
cycle exists (e.g. Gerlach, 1988; Lumsdaine and Prasad, 1997; Darvas and Szapáry 2005; Canova
et al. 2004), consistent with the absence of important asymmetries. Fatás and Mihov (2003a) studied
discretionary fiscal policy for 91 countries and conclude (p1419) "governments that use fiscal poli-
cy aggressively induce significant macroeconomic instability" i.e., output volatility. Similarly, Fatás
and Mihov (2004) study the American states and conclude that budgetary restrictions lead to lower
fiscal policy volatility and smoother business cycles; they conclude (p23) that "fiscal policy is a sig-
nificant source of business cycle volatility among US states, and, as a result, constraints on politi-
cians leads to less volatile economic fluctuations". Perhaps the work closest to ours is that of Kose
et al. (2003) who study determinants of coherence of a country's business cycle with a global busi-
ness cycle. One interpretation of their findings (p 62) is that "fiscal policies exacerbate country-spe-
cific fluctuations".
Still, to our knowledge, no one has explored the link between differences of national fiscal policies





We are interested in investigating the empirical linkages between persistent cross-country differ-
ences in the fiscal policy and business cycle synchronization. We are also interested in the effects
of the average cross-country level of aggregate fiscal policy on business cycle synchronization.
5 
Our primary measure of fiscal divergence is the difference between countries in the general gov-
ernment budget surplus (+) or deficit (-), measured as a percentage of national GDP. In 1999, the
Austrian deficit was 2.3% of GDP, while the Belgian deficit was .4%. Thus our measure of Austrian-
Belgian fiscal divergence in 1999 is 1.9%. Taking the average of this over a decade of annual data
yields our measure of fiscal divergence (.98 for average Austrian-Belgian fiscal divergence during
1994-2003). That is, we measure fiscal divergence as:
FiscalDivergeij  = .1·Σ ( Budgit- Budgjt|)
where Budgit is the general government budget surplus (+) or deficit (-) at time t expressed as a
percentage of nominal GDP for country i, and the averaging is done over a decade of annual data.
A larger value of FiscalDiverge corresponds to higher average divergence between the fiscal posi-
tions of the two countries over the relevant period of time.
The total government budget position as a percentage of GDP is of great relevance; the Maastricht
convergence criteria focus on this measure. However, we also examine the analogue using the
cyclically adjusted primary budget position (also measured as a percentage of GDP). Since the pri-
mary balance excludes interest payments (and thus the impact of the government debt level), it bet-
ter captures discretionary fiscal policy (as well as acting as a robustness check).
We note that our measure of international fiscal divergence indicates little about the pro- or count-
er-cyclic nature of national fiscal policy. A standard argument used against the Stability and Growth
Pact is that countries that are constrained to have the same monetary policy should have good
access to counter-cyclic fiscal policy. But the average level of the budget deficit is unrelated to its
counter- or pro-cyclic stance, especially when the data is smoothed over a decade. Countries that
use fiscal policy counter-cyclically sometimes have persistent deficits, but so do countries with pro-
cyclic fiscal policy.
6 In any case, our focus is on the average difference between fiscal positions.
Fiscal policy was highly divergent at the signing of the Maastricht Treaty. In 1992, four European
countries had total government budget deficits in excess of 6% of GDP (Belgium 8%; Greece
12.2%; Italy 10.7%; and UK 6.5%), while another four had deficits of less than 3% of GDP (Austria
1.9%; and Denmark 2.2%; Germany 2.6%; Luxembourg .3%). The Maastricht treaty encouraged fis-
cal convergence since it pointed potential EMU entrants towards lower deficits. For this reason, we
find it interesting to determine the consequences, if any, of fiscal convergence. But clearly the treaty
encouraged members to converge to lower deficits (of no more than 3% of GDP), not to similar
deficits irrespective of their level. Accordingly, we also examine the effect of the average cross-
5We also briefly examine effects of other Maastricht criteria, such as those for inflation, exchange rates, etc.
6See, e.g., Gavin and Perotti (1997).country level of the total government budget deficit, measured as a percentage of GDP. We meas-
ure this by:
AvgFiscalij  = .1·Σ  (Budgit+ Budgjt)/2
Again, we also examine the analogy for the primary budget position.
Our other important variable is business cycle synchronization. We focus on this because it is
arguably the most important criteria of the traditional Mundell optimum currency area criteria. Regions
with more synchronized business cycles have less need of individual monetary policies, and are thus
better candidates for currency union. While it is by no means the only criteria, it seems a natural place
to search for an overlap between Maastricht and Mundell.
We are interested in the bilateral correlation between real activity in country i and country j over
decade  . There is no obvious single measure for this; accordingly, we construct a number of prox-
ies. We begin by using two standard measures of real economic activity: (the natural logarithm of)
real GDP and the unemployment rate. We then de-trend the variables so as to focus on business
cycle fluctuations (i.e., the combination of shocks and propagation mechanisms), in two different
ways: 1) we take simple first-differences of annual variables; 2) we use the well-known Hodrick-
Prescott ("HP") filter (with the standard annual smoothing parameter of 100). After de-trending our
variables over the entire available sample, we are able to compute bilateral correlations for real activity.
These correlation coefficients are estimated (for a given concept of real economic activity and de-
trending technique), between two countries over a given span of time. Thus, for instance, we estimate
the correlation between (HP-de-trended real) Austrian and Belgian GDP, between 1964 and 1973.
We also investigate a number of other measures of business cycle synchronization below to ensure
that our results are insensitive to the underlying measure of economic activity, the de-trending tech-
nique, etc. Thus we also use industrial production, we de-trend with the Baxter-King "BK" (1999)
band-pass filter, and so forth.
2.2 The Data Set
Our default sample includes twenty-one OECD countries; these are listed in Appendix Table A1a. We
stick to the OECD Economic Outlook data set because it is both high quality and the most relevant
for e.g., questions concerning EMU. Our underlying data set consists of annual observations (though
with some gaps); we also use quarterly data (which has more holes) as a robustness check. The data
set spans 1964 through 2003, which we then split into four decades (1964-73, 1974-83, 1984-93, and
1994-2003). We are thus left with a panel of data; the maximum possible sample size is 840 obser-
vations; 210 bilateral country-pair "dyads" [=(21x20)/2], with four decadal observations per country-
pair.
8 Descriptive statistics for key variables are provided in Appendix Table A2. 
Figure 1 provides a set of four simple scatterplots of our four default measures of business cycle syn-
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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7Ditto, Table 7A of "Cyclical Adjustment of Budget Balances."
8In practice there are often gaps in our data set.Methodology
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chronization (GDP/Unemployment, differenced/HP-filtered) graphed against budget divergence.
Non-parametric data smoothers are also provided in the graphs; these demonstrate a loose negative
relationship between the two variables. Figures 2 and 3 are analogues that portray observations from
the most recent (1994-2003) decade and EMU members respectively. Figure 4 is the analogue that
portrays divergence in the primary (instead of the total) fiscal balance. Finally, Figures 5 and 6 are
scatterplots of business cycle synchronization against the average cross-country levels of the total
and primary budget positions respectively. There is reasonably consistent ocular evidence of a neg-
ative relationship between fiscal divergence and business cycle synchronization. However, there is
no sign of a strong link between the latter and the average total fiscal level, though the correlations
are higher for the average primary budget position.
2.3 Estimation
Our general empirical strategy follows that of Frankel and Rose (1998) who focused on the endo-
geneity of business cycle synchronization with respect to trade.
The benchmark regressions we estimate are non-structural and take the simple form:
Corr(v,s)ij  = α + βFiscalDivergeij  + εij .
Corr(v,s)ij  denotes the correlation coefficient between country i and country j over decade τ for activ-
ity concept v (corresponding to log real GDP or the unemployment rate), de-trended with method s
(corresponding to differencing or HP-filtering). FiscalDivergeij  denotes the average (over decade τ)
absolute difference in the government budget position (measured as a percentage of national GDP)
between countries i and j. Finally, ε ij  represents the myriad influences on bilateral activity correla-
tions above and beyond the influences of fiscal divergence (hopefully unrelated to our regressor),
and α and β are the regression coefficients to be estimated. 
The object of interest to us is the slope coefficient β. A negative estimate of β indicates that an
increase in fiscal divergence is associated with reduced business cycle coherence. That is, fiscal
policy convergence is linked to more synchronized business cycles.
A simple OLS regression of bilateral activity income correlations on fiscal divergence might be inap-
propriate for a couple of reasons. First, there may be non-trivial measurement error in fiscal diver-
gence (especially since measuring the general government budget position itself seems difficult). A
potentially more important worry is simultaneity. Suppose that for some exogenous reason a high-
deficit country decides to engage in long-term fiscal consolidation. If this leads to a recession, ceteris
paribus, we might expect fiscal convergence to coincide with lower business cycle synchronization,
at least over a short period of time.
9 Alternatively, suppose that a high-deficit country decides to
engage in fiscal consolidation and convergence simultaneously (e.g., during the drive to EMU); in
this case, the effect goes the opposite way.
9Further, short-run fiscal spillovers results in the same problem. We try to minimize such issues by estimating our business cycle synchronizations
using decades, but the issue remains.Accordingly, our default estimation is conducted with both OLS and instrumental variables. Our instru-
mental variables are associated with (cross-country differences in) the size and composition of public
sector activity, since the public finance/political economy literature has shown these to be of relevance
(e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1997). Thus we use expenditure variables (such as government investment
and non-wage consumption), as well as revenue variables (e.g., direct business and household taxes),
all expressed as percentages of GDP. We check that our OLS and IV results are consistent and also
show that our results are insensitive to the exact choice of instrumental variables.
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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3.1 Benchmark Results on Fiscal Convergence and Business Cycle
Synchronization
Our main results are presented in Tables 1 and 2. These display estimates of β, the estimated effect of
fiscal divergence on business cycle synchronization. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pair
dyads) for the slope coefficients are presented beneath the coefficients in parentheses. One (two)
asterisk(s) mark a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at the .05 (.01) confidence level.
Table 1 presents OLS results, while our IV estimates are tabulated in Table 2.
The first row of each table present four benchmark estimates, one for each of our four default ways of
measuring business cycle synchronization (arranged in columns). All four coefficients are negative and
distinguishable from zero with a high level of statistical confidence, for both OLS and IV. Moreover, the
effects are economically important. A simple average of the four coefficients is -.034 for OLS. This
implies that a reduction in fiscal divergence of (say) 2.5 percentage points – equal to one standard devi-
ation in fiscal divergence – around its mean tends to raise the correlation of business cycles between
a pair of countries, ceteris paribus, by around .085. Since the average correlation coefficient in the sam-
ple is around .3, this effect is neither trivial nor implausible. The IV results are approximately four times
larger, and remain highly statistically significant. We try to be conservative in estimating the magnitude
of our effect (especially when the model is so simple), but are reassured by the fact that OLS and IV
deliver the same sign.
Succinctly, our initial results show that fiscal convergence tends to raise business cycle synchroniza-
tion.
3.2 Sensitivity Analysis
Our benchmark estimates are derived from a simple setup; before taking them seriously, it is critical to
establish their robustness. The remainder of tables 1 and 2 is devoted to sensitivity analysis. In partic-
ular, we explore the robustness of our finding to: a) differences in the estimation technique; b) differ-
ences in the sample; c) the inclusion of other controls; and d) different measures of fiscal policy. None
of these alters our basic finding that fiscal convergence is associated with increased business cycle
synchronization.
Our analysis examines pairs of countries over different periods of time. It is thus natural to add country
pair-specific (dyadic) fixed effects. When we do so, β remains negative; its statistical significance falls
somewhat, while its economic importance grows substantially with IV, and shrinks with OLS. Further, the
fixed effects themselves are jointly insignificant at standard levels (except for two of the OLS equations).
It seems that dyadic fixed effects are not the reason for our finding of a negative β. Similarly, removing
the decade (time-specific) fixed effects does not change our conclusion.
3 EmpiricsOur results seem insensitive to the exact handling of EMU observations. Dropping country-pairs that
eventually joined EMU does not destroy our result; neither does adding a separate intercept for EMU
dyads. Our significantly negative β estimate also survives dropping observations from the first two
decades of our sample, and dropping all observations with residuals lying more than two standard devi-
ations from zero.
When we drop the six smallest countries from our sample (thereby halving the number of bilateral obser-
vations available to us), our results remain negative and significant when we use unemployment to
measure the business cycle; the same is true when we use only G7 data.
Frankel and Rose (1998) demonstrated that trade integration had the effect of raising business cycle
synchronization. Baxter-Kouparitsas (2005) showed that among the various candidates (not including
our fiscal variables) suggested in the literature to determine business cycle synchronization, only trade
integration has robust effects. Might including trade in the regression reduce the effect of fiscal diver-
gence? No. We add bilateral trade between countries i and j, normalized by the ratio of their GDPs,
using four geographic determinants of the gravity model of bilateral trade as instrumental variables.
10 As
expected, trade has a positive and usually significant effect on business cycle synchronization, but its
presence makes little difference to the effect of fiscal divergence on business cycles.
11 Our results are
also not substantially affected when we include the four gravity variables directly in our equation.
12
Our next sensitivity analyses uses different variants of the fiscal divergence regressor. First, we use the
absolute value of the average (over time) gap between the two countries' budget positions, instead of
using the average of the absolute value. Since budget balances are persistent, this variant delivers
almost identical results to our benchmark. Second, we use (averages of absolute values of) primary
budget deficits instead of total budget deficits; this delivers economically large results that remain sta-
tistically significant.
13 Interestingly, these significantly negative estimates persist when we restrict our
attention to either the G7 countries or the largest fifteen countries in our sample (for both GDP and
unemployment). It seems that our results do not stem from any particular set of countries. 
We also use the gap between the two countries' actual government budget deficits and the Maastricht
targets of a maximal 3% deficit/GDP ratio.
14 Here we find weaker results; there is a statistically signifi-
cant result only when we use unemployment. That is, cross-country deviations from the Maastricht con-
vergence criteria (and thus the Stability Pact's ceiling of 3% deficits) do not seem to have a substantial
consistent effect on cycle synchronization.
15 
Towards the bottom of Table 1, we also use the standard deviation (computed over the ten years inside
each decadal observation) of the gap between the two countries' budget/GDP ratios, in place of our
default measure of fiscal divergence. OLS estimates indicate that variation in the budget deficit posi-
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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10The four instrumental variables are: 1) the natural logarithm of the great circle bilateral distance between the two countries; 2) the log of the prod-
uct of the countries' land areas; 3) a common land border dummy; and 4) a common language dummy.
11This is unsurprising since trade is almost uncorrelated with fiscal divergence.
12Our results also do not change when we control for the inflation differential (an imperfect measure of monetary policy).
13We use the OECD's measure "Primary Government Balance, Cyclically Adjusted, % Potential GDP".
14We formalize this as follows. If both countries meet the 3% target, the gap between them is zero. If one meets the criterion and one has a deficit
of say 4% of GDP, the gap is 1% (of GDP). If neither meets the criteria, one country's deficit is 5% and the other's is 6%, the difference between
them is also 1% (of GDP).
15This may be unsurprising, since there is little reason to think that convergence to 3% should have a different effect on business cycle synchro-
nization than convergence to another deficit level.Empirics
15
tions between the countries tends to lower their business cycle synchronization, which support our
benchmark results.
It is comforting to us that OLS and IV estimates both sign β negatively. Nevertheless, we do not have vast
confidence in our instrumental variables themselves. (Our first stage is tabulated in Appendix Table A3;
while three of the instrumental variables are significant, the R
2 of the first stage is only .18.) Accordingly,
we use four different sets of instrumental variables, combining measures of government revenue and
expenditure series in different ways. We tabulate these results towards the bottom of Table 2. Both the
economic and statistical significance of β varies depending on the estimator and measure of business
cycle coherence. Still, all the estimates are negative, and the vast majority are significantly so.
We also check whether our finding (that fiscal divergence lowers business cycle synchronization) is
immune to the addition of the average level of the government budget position. That is, we add
AvgFiscal to our default equation and re-estimate. As can be seen from the bottoms of Tables 1 and 2,
the effect of fiscal divergence on business cycle synchronization is unaffected when we control for the
level of the average (cross-country) fiscal deficit; β remains economically and statistically significant. 
3.3 Further Robustness Checks
Table 3 provides more sensitivity checks, using a number of different measures of business cycle syn-
chronization. Rather than rely on a single measure of business cycle coherence in the benchmark
results, we used four measures in Tables 1 and 2. Still, there is no reason not to try others. The rows of
Table 3 correspond to the estimated effect of fiscal divergence on fifteen further measures of business
cycle synchronization. In different columns we provide OLS and IV estimates of β.
The first rows of Table 3 use industrial production (rather than GDP or unemployment) as the underly-
ing measure of economic activity. Next, we follow Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) in measuring busi-
ness cycle divergence. Alesina et al first construct the ratio of the two countries' log real GDP; they then
regress that ratio on two of its lags and an intercept. The root mean squared error of the residual is their
measure of business cycle divergence. Since a smaller number implies greater synchronization, we
expect the sign of β to be reversed (compared with that of the correlation coefficient of de-trended busi-
ness cycles). We construct Alesina-Barro-Tenreyro measures for log real GDP, log real GDP per capi-
ta, the unemployment rate, and the log of industrial production. 
A third set of checks uses the Baxter-King (1999) band-pass filter to de-trend the underlying data (we
use 2-8 years, corresponding to their 6-32 quarters). Finally, we switch to using underlying quarterly
data rather than annual data. The finer frequency comes at a cost of a smaller data span.
None of the results in Table 3 alter our conclusions. The checks work well in the sense that β remains
significantly negative for almost all the perturbations.
As an additional robustness check, we broadened the country coverage to include developing countries
as well. This extended database covers 115 countries (hence it has a maximum of 6555 [=115*114/2]
bilateral country-pairs) for four decades. Since the unemployment rate and our instrumental variables
16For instance, we cannot exclude the possibility of simultaneity from any available fiscal aggregate. are missing for many observations, we are constrained to use only GDP and OLS. The results are tab-
ulated in Table A6. As in Tables 1 and 2, we find a negative and mostly significant relationship between
fiscal divergence and business cycle synchronization (though when pair-specific effects are included,
the coefficients lose significance).
3.4 Does the Average Budget Position have an Effect on Business Cycle
Synchronization?
Thus far we have found strong evidence that persistent cross-country differences in government budget
positions have a (negative) effect on the synchronization of their business cycles. An interesting but dif-
ferent question is whether the average (cross-country) levels of government budget positions also affect
business cycle synchronization. We now investigate that issue.
17 
Table 4 contains estimates of the effect of the average (across pair of countries) government budget
position on business cycle synchronization. Since we analyze two underlying concepts of economic
activity (GDP and unemployment), three de-trending techniques (HP-filtering, differencing, and BK-fil-
tered), two estimators (OLS and IV), and two budget concepts (total and primary), we provide twenty-
four (=2*3*2*2) different point estimates and their standard errors.
We find little evidence that the total budget deficit has a consistent effect on business cycle synchro-
nization. Seven of the twelve estimates are negative (two of those are statistically significant), while five
are positive (non significant). All are small. However, all twelve of the coefficients for the primary budget
effects are positive, three-quarters of them significantly so. We interpret the evidence as indicating that
lower primary fiscal deficits (or higher primary surpluses) enhance business cycle synchronization.
Further, when we use our extended sample of 115 countries, the average total budget balance has a
positive and significant effect on synchronization, as can be seen from the last column of Table A6.
Still, we do not wish to over-interpret our findings. The average primary budget position is negatively
correlated with our default measure of fiscal divergence (as can be seen from Table A2). When we
include both fiscal divergence and the average primary budget position in our regressions, the former
remains significantly negative (as can be seen from Tables 1 and 2), while the latter effect loses the
horse-race (its effect becomes economically and statistically small, and varies across specifications).
We have searched without success for a non-linear or interactive effect, and consider this to be a good
topic for future research. That is, there is evidence that primary fiscal consolidation enhances business
cycle synchronization, but it is weak. By way of comparison, there is strong evidence that fiscal diver-




17We have already shown in Tables 1 and 2 that controlling for the average level of the government budget position (i.e., including AvgFiscal in our
regressions) has little effect on the economic or statistical significance of β .
18We have also briefly investigated the effects of other Maastricht criteria on business cycle synchronization; estimates appear in Table A5. There
is some evidence that exchange rate volatility, and divergence in inflation, long interest rates, and government debt levels all tend to lower busi-
ness cycle synchronization. However, none of the effects is particularly strong or consistent. We view this as an area worthy of future research.17
In section 3, we established that fiscal convergence seems to induce greater business cycle synchro-
nization. If one takes the finding as given, the question remains: Why? We think the answer is that fis-
cal divergence tends to occur when one country runs a substantially and persistently higher budget
deficit than other countries, and simultaneously creates fiscal shocks. That is, irresponsible fiscal poli-
cy (a persistently high deficit) coincides with idiosyncratic (fiscal) instability. When the budget deficit is
closed (fiscal convergence), the fiscal shocks diminish; business cycles tend to become more syn-
chronized. Succinctly, fiscal policy that is irresponsible is also fiscal policy that creates idiosyncratic
shocks and thus macroeconomic volatility. This idea is both intuitive and consistent with the literature
(e.g., Fatás and Mihov, 2003a, 2004).
4.1 Direct Evidence on Budgets and Macroeconomic Volatility via a Unilateral
Panel
We now test our intuition in a straightforward way. We are interested in testing for a (negative) link
between a country's average budget position and its business cycle volatility. Our evidence thus far has
relied on bilateral data, comparing fiscal policy of pairs of countries to the synchronization of their busi-
ness cycles. It is also possible to check this idea more directly using a unilateral (though still non-struc-
tural) approach. Accordingly, we gather a panel of annual data for 115 countries (see Appendix Table
A1b) between 1960 and 2003 (with gaps), consisting of data on real GDP and the total government
budget position (as a percentage of GDP; surpluses are positive, deficits negative).
19 We then de-trend
the output data by differencing and using both the HP and BK filters to create measures of business
cycle fluctuations. We compare both the average absolute value of these business cycle deviations,
and their volatility – proxied by the standard deviation (estimated for a country over time) – to the aver-
age level of the government's fiscal position. A negative relationship between the two indicates that
smaller deficits or larger surpluses are associated with reduced business cycle volatility, consistent with
our hypothesis.
We exploit our (country x year) panel of data in three different ways. First, we estimate panel regres-
sions of the effect of the government budget position on business cycle deviations from trend at the
annual frequency. Second, we split our 44-year data set into four eleven-year periods, so that each
country contributes a maximum of four observations. Finally, we average over all 44 years, creating a
single cross-section where each country contributes a single observation. For the first two cases, we
estimate our models with differing sets of country- and time-specific fixed effects.
Our results are contained in Table 5. The top panel portrays annual results; the middle presents results
estimated at the 11-year frequency; and the bottom shows cross-sectional results that average out the
entire 44-year sample.
4 Interpretation: Fiscal Irresponsibility tends to be
Idiosyncratic
19We do not know of a source that systematically provides primary fiscal positions for countries outside the OECD.The point estimates from our annual results are all negative; a higher fiscal surplus (or lower deficit) is
associated with smaller (in absolute value) business cycle deviations from trend. The results are statis-
tically significant at conventional levels for twelve perturbations. When we shift to a lower frequency, we
can examine both the average (over eleven years) of the mean absolute value of business cycle devi-
ations, and the volatility of business cycles (the standard deviation of de-trended log real GDP). 20 of
the 24 point estimates are negative, eight significantly so; none of the positive coefficients is economi-
cally or statistically large. Finally, when we examine a single cross-section of our countries, we again
find that larger fiscal surpluses/smaller deficits are associated with lower business cycle volatility. At this
very low frequency, all six point estimates are negative and half of them are significantly different from
zero at standard confidence levels.
We do not consider this evidence to be overwhelming. Since we have essentially no structure in our
empirical model, our results are suggestive rather than definitive. Still, we have not found evidence
inconsistent with our hypothesis either in the literature or in our own empirical work. The hypothesis that




The motivation for this paper is simple. The criteria that make a currency area optimal were established
long ago by Mundell and have essentially no intersection with the "Maastricht convergence" criteria
used to govern the actual entry of countries into European Monetary Union. In this paper, we ask: does
Maastricht indirectly overlap with Mundell?
The answer is positive. We find that fiscal convergence – similarity in the aggregate budget positions
across countries – is systematically associated with enhanced business cycle synchronization. Fiscal
convergence raises business cycle synchronization by eliminating idiosyncratic fiscal shocks. We find
evidence that reduced primary fiscal deficits (or higher surpluses) also increase the coherence of busi-
ness cycles across countries. The Maastricht convergence process encouraged both fiscal conver-
gence and reduced deficits for the Euro-12 during the run-up to EMU. Our results indicate that this fis-
cal convergence would have raised their business cycle coherence, making them better candidates for
currency union. Even if not by design, Maastricht mimics Mundell! 
There is a different (though consistent) interpretation of our results. Conventional wisdom tells us that
national fiscal policy is the sole macroeconomic tool to smooth the business cycle when a country is hit
by asymmetric shocks in a currency union. Yet the Maastricht criteria impose convergence of budget
deficits at low levels. Consequently, Maastricht could reduce business cycle synchronization and
increase volatility. In fact though, fiscal convergence seems to increase cycle synchronization by reduc-
ing volatile fiscal shocks.
If our finding is corroborated, it is of more than academic interest. The Maastricht criteria continue to
govern future entry into the euro zone. Further, the Stability and Growth Pact continues, in principle, to
constrain fiscal policy for the EU. If either or both of these institutions induce fiscal convergence, they
indirectly enhance the desirability and sustainability of EMU. Two cheers!
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Effect of Fiscal Divergence on Business Cycle Synchronization, OLS
GDP, HP-Filtered GDP, Differenced Unemployment, Unemployment, 
HP Filtered Differenced
Benchmark -.036** -.024** -.048** -.028**
(.006) (.005) (.006) (.005)
Pair-Specific Fixed Effects -.022** -.010 -.034** -.005
(.008) (.007) (.009) (.008)
Without Decade Effects -.027* -.013** -.032** -.016**
(.006) (.005) (.006) (.006)
Without EMU Pairs -.039** -.026** -.050** -.029**
(.007) (.006) (.007) (.006)
Add EMU-Pairs Intercept -.036** -.024** -.048** -.028**
(.006) (.005) (.006) (.005**)
Last Half of Sample -.055** -.040** -.073** -.045**
(.009) (.007) (.010) (.009)
Without 2σ Outliers -.040** -.024** -.046** -.028**
(.006) (.004) (.006) (.005)
Without six small -.016 .000 -.075** -.052**
(.011) (.009) (.011) (.010)
G7 only -.012 -.010 -.064* -.061*
(.019) (.017) (.025) (.023)
Add Trade/GDP Ratio -.030** -.018** -.042** -.022**
(.006) (.005) (.006) (.005)
With Gravity Regressors -.036** -.023** -.050** -.028**
(.006) (.005) (.006) (.005)
Regressor Variant -.031** -.023** -.044** -.027**
(.006) (.005) (.005) (.005)
Primary Deficit Measure -.054** -.044** -.051** -.027**
(.009) (.007) (.010) (.009)
Primary Deficit without  -.047** -.029** -.075** -.035*
six small (.015) (.012) (.017) (.014)
Primary Deficit Measure, -.042 -.035 -.073* -.055*
G7 only (.028) (.020) (.031) (.025)
Maastricht Deviation -.013 -.012 -.041** -.023**
(.009) (.007) (.008) (.007)
Std Dev (not mean) -.084** -.049** -.077** -.034*
of Budget (.014) (.011) (.015) (.014)
With Average -.044** -.026** -.050** -.027**
Fiscal Position (.006) (.005) (.006) (.006)
With Avg Primary  -.040** -.026** -.057** .032**
Fiscal Position (.008) (.007) (.008) (.008)
Regressand is correlation coefficient (computed over decades) between country i and j de-trended series.
Coefficients recorded are effect of (average of absolute-value of differential of) government budget surplus/deficit, as percentage of
GDP. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pair dyads) recorded in parentheses. Decade effects and constant included but not
recorded.
Coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) level marked with one (two) asterisk(s). OLS estimation unless noted. 
Data set has maximum of 21*20/2=210 country pairs for four decades (1964-73, 1974-83, 1984-93, 1994-2003). 
Six small countries: Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, and New Zealand.
Regressor variant is absolute value of average of differential (not average of absolute-value of differential). Std Dev is standard devi-
ation over time of absolute value of differential of government budget surplus/deficit, % GDP.
20
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Table 2 
Effect of Fiscal Divergence on Business Cycle Synchronization, IV
GDP, HP-Filtered GDP, Differenced Unemployment, Unemployment, 
HP Filtered Differenced
Benchmark -.16** -.11** -.15** -.11**
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.03)
Pair-Specific Fixed Effects -.23** -.16** -.25** -.14*
(.08) (.06) (.08) (.06)
Without Decade Effects -.17** -.13** -.16** -.11**
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.03)
Without EMU Pairs -.12** -.07** -.11** -.07**
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02)
Add EMU-Pairs Intercept -.12** -.08** -.11** -.07**
(.03) (.02) (.03) (.02)
Last Half of Sample -.19** -.11** -.16** -.11**
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.03)
Without 2σ Outliers -.19** -.13** -.19** -.14**
(.03) (.02) (.04) (.03)
Without six small -.15* -.13** -.20** -.11*
(.06) (.05) (.06) (.04)
G7 only -.14 -.16 -.23* -.12*
(.09) (.09) (.10) (.06)
Add Trade/GDP Ratio -.09** -.05** -.06** -.04*
(Gravity IV) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02)
With Gravity Regressors -.08** -.05** -.06** -.03
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Regressor Variant -.14** -.10** -.14** -.09*
(.03) (.03) *(.03) (.02)
Primary Deficit Measure -.15** -.13** -.19** -.10**
(.04) (.05) (.03) (.03)
Primary without six small -.12** -.09** -.16** -.06*
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.03)
Primary Deficit Measure,  -.16* -.14* -.18 -.07
G7 only (.08) (.06) (.09) (.05)
Deviation from Maastricht -.03 -.06* -.09* -.05
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.03)
With Average  -.16** -.12** -.15** -.11**
Fiscal Position (.04) (.03) (.04) (.03)
With Avg Primary  -.14** -.09** -.12** -.10**
Fiscal Position (.05) (.03) (.04) (.03)
IV Variant 1 -.16** -.12** -.29** -.25**
(.05) (.06) (.04) (.06)
IV Variant 2 -.14** -.08* -.08** -.03
(.04) (.03) (.03) (.03)
IV Variant 3 -.18** -.10* -.12** -.07*
(.06) (.04) (.05) (.03)
IV Variant 4 -.19** -.15** -.20** -.15**
(.06) (.05) (.05) (.04)
Regressand is correlation coefficient (computed over decades) between country i and j de-trended series.
Coefficients recorded are effect of (average of absolute-value of differential of) government budget surplus/deficit, as percentage of
GDP. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pair dyads) recorded in parentheses. Decade effects and constant included but not
recorded.
Coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) level marked with one (two) asterisk(s).
Instrumental Variable estimation unless noted. IVs include: a) government non-wage consumption/GDP; b) government
investment/GDP; c) direct business taxes/GDP; and d) direct household taxes/GDP. IVs are average of absolute value of cross-country
differentials.
Data set has maximum of 21*20/2=210 country pairs for four decades (1964-73, 1974-83, 1984-93, 1994-2003). Six small countries:
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, and New Zealand.
Regressor variant is absolute value of average of differential (not average of absolute-value of differential). Std Dev is standard devi-
ation over time of absolute value of differential of government budget surplus/deficit, % GDP.
IV Variant 1: a) government non-wage consumption/GDP; b) government investment/GDP; c) effective labor taxes as percentage of
labor costs; and d) indirect taxes/GDP. Variant 2: a) government social benefits/GDP: b) government wages/GDP; and c) direct busi-
ness taxes/GDP. Variant 3: a) direct household taxes/GDP; b) indirect taxes/GDP; and c) direct business taxes/GDP. Variant 4: a) gov-
ernment non-wage consumption/GDP; b) government wages/GDP; and c) government investment/GDP. 
Gravity regressors are: 1) log distance; 2) log product land area; 3) common land border dummy; 4) common language dummy. Table 3 






































Quarterly Industrial Production, HP-Filtered
-.021** -.06**
(.004) (.02)
Quarterly Industrial Production, Differenced
-.016** -.05**
(.004) (.02)






Quarterly Industrial Production,  .0008** .0013*
Alesina-Barro-Tenreyro (.0001) (.0006)
IVs include: a) government non-wage consumption/GDP; b) government investment/GDP; c) direct business taxes/GDP; and d) direct
household taxes/GDP. IVs are average of absolute value of cross-country differentials.
Coefficients recorded are effect of (average of absolute-value of differential of) government budget surplus/deficit, as percentage of
GDP.
Coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) level marked with one (two) asterisk(s)
Data set has maximum of 21*20/2=210 country pairs for four decades (1964-73, 1974-83, 1984-93, 1994-2003).
Decade effects and constant included but not recorded.
Alesina-Barro-Tenreyro measure is root mean squared error of residual from AR(2) of log ratios (lower => greater co-movement).





Average Budget Positions and Business Cycle Synchronization
GDP, HP GDP, Diff. GDP, BK Unem, HP Unem, Diff. Unem, BK
Total Budget (% GDP) IV -.04 .00 -.04 .00 -.00 -.01
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Total Budget (% GDP) OLS -.02* -.00 -.02** .01 .01 .01
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Primary Budget (% GDP) IV .11** .09** .12** .10** .03 .07**
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.03)
Primary Budget (% GDP) OLS .03** .02* .05** .02 .01 .03**
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
IVs include: a) government non-wage consumption/GDP; b) government investment/GDP; c) direct business taxes/GDP; and d) direct
household taxes/GDP. IVs are average of absolute value of cross-country differentials.
Coefficients recorded are effect of cross-country average level of total/primary government budget surplus/deficit, as percentage of
GDP.
Coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) level marked with one (two) asterisk(s)
Data set has maximum of 21*20/2=210 country pairs for four decades (1964-73, 1974-83, 1984-93, 1994-2003).
Decade effects and constant included but not recorded.
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pair dyads) recorded in parentheses.Table 5
Government Budgets and Business Cycle Volatility
Annual Panel results
Hodrick-Prescott Baxter-King Differenced
Common intercept -.057** -.050** -.080**
(.014) (.011) (.016)
Year Effects -.038** -.040** -.072**
(.014) (.011) (.017)
Country Effects -.058** -.042** -.066**
(.015) (.012) (.019)
Year and Country Effects -.038** -.032** -.060**
(.015) (.012) (.019)
Observations 3371 2944 3308
Regressands are the absolute value of detrended log real GDP, either a) Hodrick-Prescott filtered, b) Baxter-King band-pass filtered
or c) differenced (country specific mean growth removed from differences before taking absolute values). Regressor is government
budget, % GDP.
Long-Run Panel Results (for data averaged over 11-year periods)
Standard deviation Mean absolute value
Hodrick-Prescott Baxter-King Differenced Hodrick-Prescott Baxter-King Differenced
Common intercept -.062* -.067** -.083 -.070** -.051* -.115**
(.035) (.033) (.057) (.033) (.027) (.040)
Period Effects -.039 -.052 -.068 -.046 -.040 -.111**
(.036) (.033) (.059) (.036) (.027) (.044)
Country Effects -.033 -.029 .010 -.076** -.032 -.073*
(.048) (.046) (.072) (.038) (.035) (.043)
Period, Country Effects .012 .000 .039 -.032 -.010 -.072
(.047) (.046) (.071) (.040) (.035) (.047)
Observations 365 349 364 368 354 365
Regressands are either a) standard deviation or b) mean absolute value of log real GDP, either a) Hodrick-Prescott filtered, b) Baxter-
King band-pass filtered or c) differenced (country specific mean growth removed from differences before taking absolute values) over
four 11-year long periods. Regressor is mean of government budget, % GDP.
Cross-Sectional Results (for data averaged over entire sample)
Standard deviation Mean absolute value
Hodrick-Prescott Baxter-King Differenced Hodrick-Prescott Baxter-King Differenced
Intercept -.064 -.117** -.139* -.025 -.058* -.077
(.070) (.047) (.073) (.050) (.030) (.049)
Observations 115 115 115 115 115 115
Regressands are either a) standard deviation or b) mean absolute value of log real GDP, either a) Hodrick-Prescott filtered, b) Baxter-
King band-pass filtered or c) differenced (country specific mean growth removed from differences before taking absolute values) over
entire period, 1960-2003. Regressor is the mean of government budget, % GDP.
Notes for all blocks. 
Coefficients from OLS regressions, multiplied by 100. Robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses (also multiplied by
100).
Coefficient significantly different from zero at .01 (.05) marked by two (one) asterisks.




Business Cycle Synchronization Against Budget Divergence
Corr Coefficients (y); Avg Abs-Val Budget/GDP Differentials (x)
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Simple Scatterplots of Key Variables, 1964-2003Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Business Cycles and Budgets, 1994-2003
Corr Coefficients (y); Avg Abs-Val Budget/GDP Differentials (x)
GDP, HP-Filtered
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Business Cycles and Budgets, EMU Members
Corr Coefficients (y); Avg Abs-Val Budget/GDP Differentials (x)
GDP, HP-Filtered
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Business Cycles and Budgets, 1964-2003
























GDP, HP-Filtered GDP, Differenced
Unemployment, HP-Filtered Unemployment, Differenced
Figure 4 
Primary Fiscal DivergenceTables and figures
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Business Cycles and Average Budget Levels, 1964-2003
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Figure 5 
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Business Cycles and Average Primary Budget Levels, 1964-2003
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Figure 6 
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Table A1a 
Countries in Default OECD Sample
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland
France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan
Netherlands Norway New Zealand Portugal Spain Sweden
Switzerland UK USA
Table A1b 
Additional Countries in Wide Sample
Argentina Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belize
Bhutan Bolivia Botswana Brazil Bulgaria Burk. Faso
Burundi Cameroon Chile China Colombia Congo
Costa Rica Croatia Cyprus Czech Rep. Dominican R. Egypt
El Salvador Estonia Fiji Ghana Guatemala Guyana
Haiti Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia
Iran Israel Jamaica Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya
Korea Kyrgyz Re. Latvia Lesotho Lithuania Madagascar
Malawi Malaysia Malta Mauritius Mexico Mongolia
Morocco Myanmar Nepal Nicaragua Nigeria Oman
Pakistan Panama Pap. N. Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines
Poland Romania Russia Rwanda Saudi Arabia Senegal
Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Slovak Republic Slovenia South Africa
Sri Lanka St. Lucia St.Vin. & Gren. Swaziland Syria Thailand
Tunisia Turkey Uganda Ukraine Uruguay Venezuela




Obs. Avg. Std. Dev. Min. Max. Corr.
Correlation Coefficient, GDP, HP-Filtered 840 .36 .44 -.88 .99 -.22
Correlation Coefficient, GDP, Differenced 840 .27 .37 -.83 .96 -.13
Correlation Coefficient, Unemployment, HP-Filtered 840 .39 .45 -.89 .98 -.29
Correlation Coefficient, Unemployment, Differenced 840 .29 .39 -.74 .99 -.22
Government Budget/GDP Divergence 840 3.65 2.52 .41 14.5 n/a
Average Government Budget/GDP Level 840 -2.77 2.47 -11.9 4.2 -.14
Primary Government Budget/GDP Divergence 617 3.12 1.90 .14 10.8 .47
Average Primary Government Budget/GDP Level 617 -.03 2.04 -6.63 5.43 -.41
Gov't Budget/GDP Divergence, Maastricht Deviation 840 1.91 2.23 .0 9.82 .70
Government non-wage consumption/GDP Divergence 800 2.46 1.76 .15 9.89 -.16
Government investment/GDP Divergence 722 1.00 .66 .06 4.01 .08
Direct business taxes/GDP Divergence 638 1.27 .86 .10 5.05 .25
Direct household taxes/GDP Divergence 602 5.25 4.36 .17 21.95 -.00
Trade/GDP Ratio 840 .49 .77 .01 7.21 -.07
Inflation Divergence 840 3.48 3.18 .36 18.2 .11
Long Interest Rate Divergence 742 2.55 2.44 .08 16.3 .22
Government Debt/GDP Divergence 592 28.0 20.2 .58 106.8 .38
Standard Deviation of Exchange Rate 840 .12 .09 .003 .58 .03
Maximum Change of Exchange Rate 840 .28 .13 .02 .67 .15








Direct Business Taxes/GDP .44**
(.11)
Direct Household Taxes/GDP -.02
(.02)
Regressand is (average of absolute-value of differential of) government budget surplus/deficit, as percentage of GDP. Coefficients esti-
mated via OLS. Standard errors recorded in parentheses.
All regressors are average of absolute value of cross-country differentials.
Data set has maximum of 21*20/2=210 country pairs for four decades (1964-73, 1974-83, 1984-93, 1994-2003).
Decade effects and constant included but not recorded.
Coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) level marked with one (two) asterisk(s).Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Table A4 
Business Cycle Synchronization in Different Fiscal Regimes
A: GDP HP-Filtered, Total Deficit
Surplus/Deficit < 1% Deficit in (1,6)% Deficit > 6%
Surplus/Deficit < 1% .30 (85)
Deficit in (1,6)% .35 (278) .42 (293)
Deficit > 6% .07 (32) .35 (136) .46 (16)
B: GDP Differenced Total Deficit
Surplus/Deficit < 1% Deficit in (1,6)% Deficit > 6%
Surplus/Deficit < 1% .30 (85)
Deficit in (1,6)% .26 (278) .29 (293)
Deficit > 6% .13 (32) .27 (136) .38 (16)
C: Unemployment HP-Filtered Total Deficit
Surplus/Deficit < 1% Deficit in (1,6)% Deficit > 6%
Surplus/Deficit < 1% .39 (85)
Deficit in (1,6)% .35 (278) .47 (293)
Deficit > 6% -.11 (32) .38 (136) .49 (16)
D: Unemployment Differenced Total Deficit
Surplus/Deficit < 1% Deficit in (1,6)% Deficit > 6%
Surplus/Deficit < 1% .38 (85)
Deficit in (1,6)% .25 (278) .32 (293)
Deficit > 6% .02 (32) .30 (136) .38 (16)
E: GDP HP-Filtered, Primary Surplus/Deficit
Primary Surplus > 1.5% Balance in (-1.5,1.5)% Primary Deficit > 1.5%
Primary Surplus > 1.5% 0.45 (62)
Balance in (-1.5,1.5)% 0.45 (145) 0.44 (132)
Primary Deficit > 1.5% 0.18 (56) 0.39 (165) 0.35 (57)
F: GDP Differenced, Primary Surplus/Deficit
Primary Surplus > 1.5% Balance in (-1.5,1.5)% Primary Deficit > 1.5%
Primary Surplus > 1.5% 0.34 (62)
Balance in (-1.5,1.5)% 0.39 (145) 0.34 (132)
Primary Deficit > 1.5% 0.19 (56) 0.28 (165) 0.25 (57)
G: Unemployment HP-Filtered, Primary Surplus/Deficit
Primary Surplus > 1.5% Balance in (-1.5,1.5)% Primary Deficit > 1.5%
Primary Surplus > 1.5% 0.27 (62)
Balance in (-1.5,1.5)% 0.39 (145) 0.53 (132)
Primary Deficit > 1.5% 0.15 (56) 0.41 (165) 0.36 (57)
H: Unemployment Differenced, Primary Surplus/Deficit
Primary Surplus > 1.5% Balance in (-1.5,1.5)% Primary Deficit > 1.5%
Primary Surplus > 1.5% 0.15 (62)
Balance in (-1.5,1.5)% 0.32 (145) 0.40 (132)
Primary Deficit > 1.5% 0.17 (56) 0.30 (165) 0.26 (57)
Deficits expressed as percentages of national GDP. Number of observations recorded in parentheses.
Data tabulated are average correlations of business cycles. Thus for the (85) cases where both countries are in total surplus or have
deficits < 1% GDP, the average correlation of de-trended GDP is .30.Tables and figures
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Table A5 
Different Criteria and Business Cycle Synchronization
OLS GDP, HP-Filtered GDP,  Unemployment,  Unemployment, 
Differenced HP-Filtered Differenced
Inflation -.01 -.01 -.02** -.02**
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Long Interest Rate -.02* -.01 -.03** -.02**
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Government Debt/GDP -.001 -.001 -.004** .003**
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Standard Deviation -.43 -.36 -.92** -.77**
of Exchange Rate  (.23) (.21) (.23) (.21)
Maximum Change -.42* -.40** -.61 -.53**
of Exchange Rate  (.18) (.14) (.16) **(.14)
IV GDP, HP-Filtered GDP, Unemployment,  Unemployment, 
Differenced HP-Filtered Differenced
Inflation -.04 -.09* -.13 -.05
(.06) (.04) (.07) (.04)
Long Interest Rate -.13** -.13** -.18** -.09*
(.04) (.04) (.05) (.04)
Government Debt/GDP -.006 -.007* -.008 -.005
(.004) (.004) (.005) (.004)
Standard Deviation -4.99** -4.83** -6.51** -3.42*
of Exchange Rate (1.56) (1.26) (1.95) (1.32)
Maximum Change -1.93** -1.79** -2.49** -1.53**
of Exchange Rate  (.57) (.43) (.67) (.52)
Regressand is correlation coefficient (computed for individual decades of annual data) between country i and j de-trended series.
Coefficients recorded are effect of (average of absolute-value of differential of) variable tabulated in left column. Coefficients signifi-
cantly different from zero at .05 (.01) level marked with one (two) asterisk(s)
IVs include: a) government non-wage consumption/GDP; b) government investment/GDP; c) direct business taxes/GDP; and d) direct
household taxes/GDP. IVs are average of absolute value of cross-country differentials.
Data set has maximum of 21*20/2=210 country pairs for four decades (1964-73, 1974-83, 1984-93, 1994-2003).
Decade effects and constant included but not recorded.
Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pair dyads) recorded in parentheses.Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Table A6 
Fiscal Divergence and Business Cycle Synchronization; OLS on a Wide Panel
Benchmark Effect of Pair-Specific With Average  Only Average
Fiscal Fixed Effects Fiscal Position Fiscal Position
Divergence
HP-Filtered -0.005** -.001 .007** -0.004**
(.001) (.003) (.001) (.002)
First-Differenced -0.002** (.001) .001 (.002)
-0.001 (.001) .005** (.001)
Regressand is correlation coefficient (computed over decades) between country i and j de-trended series.
Coefficients recorded are effect of (average of absolute-value of differential of) government budget surplus/deficit, as percentage of
GDP.
OLS estimation. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pair dyads) in parentheses. 
Decade effects and constant included but not recorded. 14,961 observations.
Coefficients significantly different from zero at .05 (.01) level marked with one (two) asterisk(s).37
OECD Economic Outlook (Annual series): Consumer Price Index; Direct Taxes, Households; Direct
Taxes, Business; Fixed Investment, Government, Value; Government Consumption, Excluding Wages;
Government Consumption, Wages; Gross Domestic Product (Market prices), Value; Gross Domestic
Product (Market prices), Volume; Gross Government Debt, % GDP; Indirect Taxes; Interest Rate, Long-
Term; Interest Rate, Short-Term; Primary Government Balance, Cyclically Adjusted, % Potential GDP;
Social Benefits Paid by Government; Unemployment Rate.
OECD Quarterly National Accounts: Gross Domestic Product, Volume.
OECD Tax Database (Annuals series): Income tax plus employee and employer contribution less cash
benefits (as % of labor costs), one-earner family with two children.
IMF International Financial Statistics (Annual series): General Government Deficit (-) or Surplus; Gross
Domestic Product, Volume and Value (for developing countries included in the wide sample); Industrial
Production (Volume). (Quarterly series): Industrial Production. (Volume). (Monthly series): Exchange
rate (National Currency per US Dollar, line RF)
IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (Annual series for 1980-2003): Exports, f.o.b.; Imports, c.i.f. 
Frankel-Rose (1998) (Annual series for 1960-1979): Exports, f.o.b.; Imports, c.i.f. 
EC AMECO database (Annual series): Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-): general government,
Percentage of GDP at market prices.
Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) (Monthly series): Parallel or Black Market Exchange Rate
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